Two years in the making, the report of the governmentโ€™s Financial Crisis Inquiry Commissionโ€”officially known as the Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United Statesโ€”is 631 fact-filled, surprisingly well-written pages long. You should read it, but letโ€™s be honestโ€”you probably wonโ€™t. Besidesโ€”we read it so you donโ€™t have to. Following are the reportโ€™s conclusions about the causes of the financial crisis, and they are worth readingโ€”unless, of course, you want it to happen again.

01. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS DIDNโ€™T HAVE TO HAPPEN.

Fed chair Ben Bernanke told the Commission that a โ€œperfect stormโ€ had occurred that regulators could never have anticipated. Alan Greenspan, the Fed chairman during the two decades leading up to the crash, told the Commission that it was beyond the ability of regulators to foresee such a bursting bubble. โ€œHistory tells us [that regulators] cannot identify the timing of a crisis, or anticipate exactly where it will be located or how large the losses and spillovers will be.โ€ But the committee concluded that regulators โ€œcould have seen this coming,โ€ and plenty of economic prognosticators predicted what Bernanke and Greenspan did not. Why werenโ€™t they listened to?


02. ASLEEP-AT-THE-WHEEL FINANCIAL REGULATORS AND SUPERVISORS THREATENED THE STABILITY OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM.

โ€œThe sentries were not at their posts,โ€ the report concludes, largely because of widespread confidence that markets self-regulate and financial institutions police themselves. The report blasts โ€œAlan Greenspan and othersโ€โ€”Bernanke and Larry Summers, two advocates of deregulation who happened to work with the Administration at the time of the reportโ€™s writing, go unmentioned. To be fair, deregulation was heavily promoted by the financial industry, which spent $2.7 billion on lobbying and $1 billion in campaign contributions during the decade before the fall of 2008.


03. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND RISK MANAGEMENT AT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FAILED.

The report takes aim at โ€œstunning instances of governance breakdowns and irresponsibility,โ€ such as when Citigroup CEO Charles Prince told the Commission that a $40 billion stake in mortgage-backed securities โ€œwould not in any way have excited my attention.โ€ Other institutions faulted: AIG, Bear Sterns, Fannie Mae, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley. Part of the problem, the report says, came from โ€œpoorly executedโ€ mergers and acquisitions that confused management. In other words, firms that advise other companies on M & Aโ€”for massive feesโ€”couldnโ€™t keep their own mergers and acquisitions in order.


04. FAILURES IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE LED TO โ€œEXCESSIVE BORROWING, RISKY INVESTMENTS AND LACK OF TRANSPARENCY.โ€

The report emphasizes how absurdly leveraged the banks were; at the not-uncommon debt-to-capital ratio of 40:1, โ€œless than a 3-percent drop in asset values could wipe out a firm.โ€ Moreover, the extent of that leverage was hidden in โ€œa shadow banking system,โ€ riddled with complicated financial instruments such as derivatives and off-balance-sheet entities so confusing, the bank heads themselves didnโ€™t always understand them. The worst perpetrators: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, whose combined leverage ratio, including loans they owned and guaranteed, stood at 75:1.


05. THE GOVERNMENT WASNโ€™T PREPARED FOR THE CRISIS, AND ITS INITIAL CLUMSY REACTIONS EXACERBATED THE SITUATION.

The Treasury, the Fed and the Federal Reserve Bank of New Yorkโ€”our most vital and powerful financial regulatory bodiesโ€”were โ€œill prepared for the events of 2007 and 2008,โ€ and when the crisis erupted, responded โ€œon an ad hoc basis โ€ฆ to put fingers in the dike.โ€ The government didnโ€™t have a plan to contain what was happening because it didnโ€™t understand what was happening. Specifically, government officials knew that a housing bubble was possible, but never realized how systemic and disastrous the consequences of it bursting would be.


06. A LACK OF ETHICS AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE FINANCIAL INDUSTRY HELPED SPARK THE CRISIS.

The structural integrity of the financial system and the American economy depends on a different kind of integrity, the Commission arguedโ€”โ€œfair dealing, responsibility and transparency.โ€ But the financial industry had grown rotten. โ€œFrom the ground level to the corporate suites,โ€ from mortgage brokers to chief executives, โ€œan erosion of standards and responsibility exacerbated the financial crisis.โ€ While it would be simplistic to blame โ€œmortal flaws like greed and hubris,โ€ the financial system failed to factor โ€œhuman weaknessโ€ into its calculations, and the results were catastrophic. The Commission put โ€œspecial responsibilityโ€ on public financial leaders, regulators and financial industry chief executives: โ€œThese individuals sought and accepted positions of significant responsibility and obligation. Tone at the top does matter, and, in this instance, we were let down.โ€


07. PLUNGING MORTGAGELENDING STANDARDS AND THE MORTGAGE SECURITIZATION โ€œPIPELINEโ€ WERE REALLY DUMB IDEAS.

The Commission puts it more delicatelyโ€”those phenomena โ€œspread the flame of contagion and crisisโ€โ€”but the point is clear: โ€œToxic mortgages from neighborhoods across Americaโ€ were transported โ€œto investors around the globe.โ€ The report describes a pyramid scheme that would have made Bernie Madoff proud: โ€œEach step in the mortgage securitization pipeline depended on the next step to keep demand going.โ€ Speculators, mortgage brokers, lenders, financial firmsโ€”โ€œthey all believed they could off-load their risks on a momentโ€™s notice to the next person in line.โ€ No one in the whole crazy process โ€œhad enough skin in the game.โ€


08. OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES? ALSO REALLY DUMB.

Think acronyms: OTC, CDS, CDOโ€”which led to a crisis at AIG. Both on the page and in the financial system, those acronyms obscure what they stand for, and in the end, โ€œthe existence of millions of derivatives contracts of all types between systemically important financial institutionsโ€”unseen and unknown in this unregulated marketโ€”added to uncertainty and escalated panic.โ€


09. THANKS BUT NO THANKS, CREDIT RATING AGENCIES.

Moodyโ€™s comes in for particular scrutiny from the Commission, but none of the big three credit rating agencies (including Standard & Poorโ€™s and Fitch) did their jobs. Instead, they suffered from โ€œflawed computer models โ€ฆ pressure from financial firms that paid for the ratings โ€ฆ the relentless drive for market share โ€ฆโ€ and so on. The agencies were complicit in the mortgage madness, and the financial crisis couldnโ€™t have happened without them.


10. ITโ€™S PRETTY MUCH THE FAULT OF BIG GOVERNMENT.

Thatโ€™s according to the dissenting conclusion from the Commissionโ€™s Republicans, who write, โ€œthe U.S. governmentโ€™s housing policies were the major contributor to the financial crisis of 2008. These policies fostered the development of a massive housing bubble between 1997 and 2007 โ€ฆ The losses associated with these [government-supported] weak and high-risk loans caused either the real or apparent weakness of the major financial institutions around the world.โ€