Poor countries can become wealthy
ones, but they must first muster the political willpower to reform their
financial systems. Singapore and Taiwan are notable examples of countries that
have done so successfully. So is Chile. South Korea has made important
institutional reforms, but needs to continue moving in this direction. China’s
leadership recognizes the need for reform, although the country has a long way
to go.
Countries remain poor partly because their financial
institutions are weak, and their economies are therefore unable to use
capital efficiently. Problems such as the lack (or poor allocation) of capital,
bad debt, ineffective regulation of the financial sector and rampant corruption
could be solved if those countries were to adopt some of the banking and market
systems that have worked in the West.
However, investors in emerging markets who are eager to see
these reforms take hold should bear in mind that many aspects of the financial
systems in developed economies are not applicable to poor countries. A crash
program of deregulation and liberalization can have negative consequences
that are difficult to predict. If the proper bank regulatory and supervisory
structures, accounting and disclosure requirements, restrictions on connected
lending and well-functioning legal and judicial systems are not in place when
liberalization occurs, the appropriate constraints on risk-taking behavior will
be far too weak. Bad loans will multiply, with potentially disastrous
consequences for bank balance sheets.
This is not to say we should throw up our hands and give up on
helping poor countries reform their systems. A nation can make reforms that will
put it on the path to wealth, but, in every case, the reforms have to be adapted
to local economic, political and cultural conditions. Consider, for example,
four areas that are particularly ripe for rethinking in every emerging market:
Minimum Capital Requirements The 1988 Basel Accord, a set of global bank regulations devised
by a group of national bank regulators, requires banks to set aside more capital
when holding higher-risk assets than they do when holding lower-risk assets, as a hedge against
the possibility of default. But the accord (and its more complex successor,
Basel II, which is being phased in over the next couple of years) was designed
primarily for advanced countries’ banking systems. It is not as effective for
emerging market economies. For example, the original accord classifies government bonds as
having the lowest risk of all bank assets, and therefore requiring the least
capital. This classification may make sense in the United States, where the
Treasury is extremely unlikely to ever default on its bonds, but it makes little
sense when applied to lower-grade government bonds issued by emerging market
countries. A major factor in the 2002 banking crisis in Argentina was the sharp
fall in the value of banks’ holdings of Argentine government bonds when these
bonds went into default. A crash program of immediate deregulation and
liberalization can have negative consequences that may be difficult
to predict. | Emerging market economies are also subject to greater economic
shocks than are advanced economies. The increased risk that banks in these
countries face suggests that the amount of capital they hold should be even
larger than is necessary in developed countries. Thus, bank capital requirements
in emerging market economies need to be even more stringent than the
international standards adopted by bank supervisors in advanced countries.Currency Mismatches One of the biggest dangers to emerging economies is caused by
the fact that much of their debt is denominated in the dollar or some other
foreign currency, while the value of their production and assets is denominated
in the domestic currency. Any event that seriously devalues the local currency
is likely to trigger a full-fledged financial crisis by decimating the balance
sheets of local banks and nonfinancial businesses. The 2002 banking crisis in
Argentina, the Asian financial meltdown of the late 1990s and the Mexican
"tequila crisis" of the mid-1990s were exacerbated by this sort of currency
mismatch. Reducing foreign-currency-denominated debt is difficult because
it means some local businesses will not be able to borrow at all. Nevertheless,
excessive liability dollarization is detrimental to the overall health of
developing economies. It creates a vicious circle: Governments are more likely
to bail out businesses and banks when they all fail together, so that a
government safety net encourages financial and nonfinancial industries to borrow
in foreign currencies, despite the fact that this leaves the economy more
vulnerable to financial crises.
|