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Last autumn, Robert Mattson, co-chair of the corporate finance group in the
Irvine, Calif., offices of the global law firm Morrison & Foerster, received
a frantic telephone call from one of his clients, an anxious and slightly
irritated chief executive of a publicly traded, midsize software
company.
“He called to tell me that his directors had changed their
spots,” Mattson recalls. Instead of quickly approving the CEO’s plans for the
company, as they had done in the past, and as he had grown to expect, the
directors had started asking for additional data and analytical reports on even
the most routine proposals. Suddenly the company’s passive board had
become an active, questioning one. The flabbergasted CEO had no idea how to
respond, but Mattson did: “I told him he would have to find a way to live with
this and win them over,” he remembers. The days of independent directors opting
for dignified silence rather than risk being labeled troublemakers are vanishing
in the wake of the scandals that tarnished the directors of Enron, Tyco,
WorldCom and other companies.
Traditionally, boards were more than just
collegial—they were made up of cronies. It was not until 1962 that a Delaware
court articulated the “prudent man” rule, stating “directors of a corporation in
managing the corporate affairs are bound to use that amount of care which
ordinarily careful and prudent men would use in similar circumstances.” It was
not until 1978 that the American Bankers Association spelled out in its handbook
for directors that a board member’s responsibility to the business and its
shareholders must take precedence over the director’s individual interests, and
that the motivation in sitting on a board should not be to pursue personal
financial, professional or social gain. Most of the structures that governance
experts recognize as “best practices’—staffing an audit committee with
financially savvy individuals, keeping management off nominating and
compensation committees, excluding management from some portion of board
meetings to allow independent directors to speak more openly—have become
required by regulators only in the past two years.
Those of us contemplating
joining a board as part of the rush to find more independent members should bear
in mind that responsibility now goes well beyond showing up with a PDA stuffed
with contacts that might be useful to company marketing and finance executives.
As directors, we are now accepting an unprecedented amount of personal
liability; ergo anyone with an invitation for a board seat must perform as much
due diligence on the board as the present members will do on the candidates,
investigating not only the company’s fundamentals but also whether mechanisms
are in place that allow for constructive disagreement. The exploration is a
soul-
TOP VIEW In the wake of scandals that tarnished the directors of Enron, Tyco, WorldCom
and others, corporate board members cannot afford to rubber stamp senior
management’s decisions. Our economic survival and professional reputations
dictate that boards not merely tolerate but encourage anyone with a contrarian’s
view to explain his objections and cast a nay vote. | searching process in which we must ask ourselves whether we would be
willing to follow the lead of directors like Roy Disney or Walter Hewlett of
Hewlett Packard & Co., taking a public stand against a company strategy that
the rest of the board supports.
Avoiding the Noose “Directors are aware, at least in theory, that
keeping their mouths shut when management is proposing a course of action worth
hundreds of millions of dollars to the company is very risky, to them personally
as well as to the company,” says Jay Lorsch, a professor at Harvard Business
School and co-author of Back to the Drawing Board (Harvard Business School
Press), a recently published book on boardroom best practices. Lorsch himself
currently serves on the boards of Blasland, Bouck & Lee, Computer Associates
International and InteCap. “Any time a scandal hits the headlines, directors
start asking themselves what they need to do to avoid putting their own heads
through the same kind of noose,” he says. When it comes to open and
spontaneous debate, however, all too often a CEO might be the one who stifles
all constructive dissent. While imperial CEOs who will tolerate no challenges
are the exception to the rule, governance experts agree, their infamy is well
recorded. Bernie Ebbers, former WorldCom CEO, was known to have little tolerance
for anyone who questioned his professional judgment. And Hollinger’s Conrad
Black, according to suits filed against the company’s directors, brought
decisions to his board to ratify long after he had already acted on them. A CEO
can acquire an undue amount of power simply by virtue of his or her long tenure,
as has Michael Eisner at Disney. Nonetheless, in all these cases, governance
gurus insist that board members could have asserted themselves. “The CEO serves
at the pleasure of the board,” says Roger Raber, president of the National
Association of Corporate Directors in Washington. D.C.
“Directors are aware, at least in theory, that keeping their mouths
shut...is risky, to them personally as well as to the company.” | Those of us who have
found no outlet for voicing dissent at a board meeting should not chastise
ourselves for timidity, however; few boards have any kind of formal procedure to
solicit or encourage dissent, leaving it up to the chairperson or lead director
to set the direction for discussions. “There is clearly a problem of group
dynamics here, one that has immense consequences for the way corporate boards
function,” says Lorsch. “In any board discussion or group meeting I have
attended, there are always people who may be antsy about where the discussion is
going but who don’t have the courage to stand and contradict people who have
more seniority on the board or a CEO who seems to have all the information.” Few
would risk the social and professional ostracism that traditionally plague the
lone dissenter.
In his book, Lorsch argues that board members need to create
formal mechanisms to foster open discussion and constructive disagreements
without producing boardroom rifts and resentment. That burden, governance
experts agree, is likely to fall on the shoulders of the growing number of
independent directors who serve on boards. “Independent” must mean not simply
coming from outside the close-knit world of Fortune 500 executives, but actually
being independent-minded. “The sad reality is that a lot of independent
directors are passive directors who accommodate the CEO by rubber-stamping
decisions or just going with the flow,” explains Raber. Going forward, he
argues, this new generation of independent directors will need to be able to
stand up to even the most strong-willed CEOs and ask tough questions. “Before
you can even get to a point where you’re having a good debate, you have to deal
with a lot of small, structural issues.”
QUESTIONS FOR THE DEVIL'S ADVOCATE 1. Does management present the
company’s raw data in a form that I can scan and understand several days before
the board meetings?
2. Does the board schedule regular executive
sessions, among members only, to discuss regular issues in greater depth and
explore big-picture developments? 3. Does the meeting agenda allow the
time and structure for open-ended discussion? | Flawed Reasoning Suzanne Hopgood, a former real estate financier who has
become an expert on turnarounds and financial restructuring, has found that some
managers believe that directors are not supposed to question even the small
issues. When she joined the board of Furr’s Restaurant Group in 1996 she issued
a simple housekeeping demand that flabbergasted senior management; she insisted
management replace the foot-high stack of data the directors received ahead of
each meeting with a much shorter analytical summary of where the company stood
vis-à-vis its competitors. “They had never had anyone ask for less information
before,” she says. “But data isn’t information.” The heftier board financials
become, Hopgood contends, the less able directors are to scan, much less absorb
and understand, the raw data they contain. If they are unable do that, how can
they detect and challenge faulty numbers or flawed reasoning?
Furr’s
gradually complied with her request, and the streamlined information flow did
indeed lead to hints of mismanagement. Finally Hopgood withdrew her name from
the management’s slate of directors up for reelection when the board was asked
to approve what she considered to be an overly generous compensation package for
management. Instead she ran in opposition on a slate of directors that pension
fund giant TIAA-CREF put forward. “It was the first time a shareholder succeeded
in replacing the entire board in a proxy fight,” Hopgood says of the battle. She
became chairman of the company in 1998, after TIAA succeeded in ousting
management amid growing concern over flagging sales and losses. The company
eventually wound down its bankrupt business in the fall of 2003, liquidating its
remaining assets.
Tweaking the board’s agenda can help foster constructive
debate and dissent, directors agree. Traditionally, a board meeting begins with
a perusal of budget plans, recent transactions and other routine matters,
leaving longer-term strategic issues such as capital raising, mergers and
acquisitions or new product development until the end. All too often, however,
discussions of the incidentals drag on, leaving little time to explore the big
picture. At Washington Mutual, Doug Beighle, the presiding director, who is in
charge of executive sessions when management is absent, moved the routine
matters to the end of the meeting.
One boardroom practice that new
governance rules now mandate is executive sessions: board meetings that exclude
boardroom observers such as consultants, external counsel and corporate
management and even, on many occasions, the CEO. Beighle is also a director of
Puget Energy, where each board meeting begins with an executive session that
includes the CEO and ends with one for independent board members only. The
independent directors also hold an annual two-day retreat in the San Juan
Islands, and are considering adding a second such off-site meeting. “There is a
big difference between a two-hour board meeting where you listen to a series of
scripted presentations, and going to a two-day retreat where there is lots of
time to dig in and really talk about issues,” says independent board member
Craig Cole, who is president and CEO of Brown & Cole Stores, a family-owned
food retailer based in Bellingham, Wash.
In his book, Lorsch suggests going
even further, appointing an individual or group of board members to be
responsible for serving as devil’s advocate. They should be charged with
assembling arguments against whatever proposal management is making,
particularly when these are “bet-the-company” decisions such as mergers or
acquisitions. Governance specialists are divided, however, on whether the
approach is useful; some call it cumbersome overkill. Cole recommends that a
director with a question or a concern seek an ally before the board meeting,
then focus dissent not on management’s proposals specifically but rather on the
lack of an environment where debate can take place. “One person dissenting can
be marginalized; it’s hard to dismiss two people as being troublemakers,” Cole
explains. “And the current buzz about governance gives anyone in this position a
great way to frame the discussion in a constructive way.”
If a CEO rejects
repeated efforts to enhance the level of open discussion, Cole warns that we
should muster ourselves for the ultimate step: either resigning or firing the
CEO. He and other directors at a large privately held distribution company opted
for the latter a few years ago. “The CEO would throw a hissy fit whenever
someone challenged him,” Cole says. When he and his fellow independent directors
hired consultants to look at the company’s finances, the CEO refused to show
them the books. That was when the directors fired him. When they did finally
examine the books, they perhaps were not too surprised to find
irregularities that nearly bankrupted the company. “Imagine what would have
happened eventually if we hadn’t disagreed with his views, but just let things
drift on as they were? Just the thought that could happen makes me
shudder.”
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